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GRAHAM, MILLER, & THE RIGHT TO HOPE
J.M. Kirby†
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2010, the Supreme Court held that it is unconstitutional to
sentence a youth, convicted for armed robbery committed at age
16, to life in prison with no hope of release.1 Graham v. Florida ex-
plicitly ends the practice of sentencing individuals convicted for
non-homicide offenses committed while under the age of 18 to life
without parole (“LWOP”).2 Justice Stevens’ concurrence, joined by
Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, placed the ruling in an ongoing
evolution of “standards of decency” in Eighth Amendment juris-
prudence.3 On June 25, 2012, the Court expanded on this decision
in Miller v. Alabama, ruling that courts may not impose mandatory
LWOP sentences on youth convicted of homicide committed while
aged 17 and under, and thus that age must be considered at sen-
tencing for these defendants.4
From the perspective of prisoners’ rights and youth advocates,
these decisions represent a positive advancement,5 particularly
when measured by international standards, which largely reject
LWOP for juveniles.6 However, they also call into question the na-
ture of the “evolution” in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, sug-
gesting that it is not fully ever-progressing, given the increased
severity of U.S. sentencing practices over the past few decades.7 Set-
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perience with NUSL’s Prisoners Assistance Project clinic continues to widen my un-
derstanding and deepen my analysis. For that, I am grateful to Professors Patty Garin
and Wally Holohan. My thanks also to the staff of the City University of New York Law
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1 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2018–20, 2030 (2010).
2 Id. at 2030.
3 Id. at 2036 (Stevens, J., concurring).
4 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460, 2469 (2012).
5 See, e.g., Adam Liptak & Lisa Faye Petak, Juvenile Killers in Jail for Life Seek a Re-
prieve, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2011, at A13 (describing juvenile justice advocates’ efforts
to extend Graham v. Florida to juvenile homicide cases); James Bell, High Court’s Deci-
sion in Miller v. Alabama is a Victory for Many, Especially in Communities of Color, JUV JUST
INFO EXCHANGE (July 9, 2012).
6 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2033 (noting that only 11 countries allow LWOP
sentences for juveniles, and that in practice, only the United States and Israel actually
impose the sentence).
7 ASHLEY NELLIS & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, NO EXIT 1 (2009)
(describing increasingly harsh sentencing policies over the past three decades, includ-
ing mandatory sentences, cuts to parole release, emphasis on drug criminalization,
149
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ting aside key decisions protecting certain classes of people from
the death penalty in the broader tough-on-crime context of the
past 30 years, the decisions could be framed more accurately as
small steps forward after decades of leaps backwards. While un-
doubtedly representing important reforms, Graham and Miller
should spark a profound rethinking of the foundation and trajec-
tory of the U.S. prison system as a whole.
The decisions point to the lessened culpability of juveniles,8
and the court in Graham notes that there is a greater chance that
young people’s “character deficiencies will be reformed.”9 Momen-
tarily suspending what this means for adults, and considering solely
the implications for youth, the decision’s potential impact is lim-
ited10 despite this recognition of young people’s probability for
positive change. In Graham, the Court’s recognition of the poten-
tial for change was not extended to those youth, even as young as
12,11 who commit homicide offenses and are charged as adults.
Miller does pose a significant hindrance to the imposition of LWOP
sentences on juveniles convicted of homicide, but it falls short of a
categorical prohibition.12 Also, it is still conceivable for someone
convicted as a juvenile to spend his or her entire life in prison,
even on a non-homicide offense. The Court wrote that states are
“not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender
convicted of a non-homicide crime.”13 Most states have mecha-
and de-emphasis on rehabilitation, all leading to dramatically increased
imprisonment).
8 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464-65.
9 Id. at 2027 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005)).
10 Courts are testing the outer limits of the Graham decision. In Virginia a Circuit
Court judge recently dismissed a petition filed by a man who was sentenced as a juve-
nile to a life sentence with no hope of parole for a non-homicide offense. The judge
reasoned, in part, that the man has an opportunity at conditional geriatric release
when he reaches age 60. See Kristin Davis, Va. Beach Judge Dismisses Claims Against Life
Sentence, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (May 5, 2011), http://hamptonroads.com/2011/05/va-
beach-judge-dismisses-claim-against-life-sentence. In another recent case, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals refused to offer relief based on the Graham decision to Reyn-
olds Wintersmith, who has served nearly two decades of a LWOP sentence on a first-
time conviction for a non-violent drug offense he committed at age 17. See Annie
Sweeney, Supporters Seek Freedom for Convict Serving Life Sentence for First Time Conviction,
CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 2, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-10-02/news/ct-
met-drug-lifer-1002-20111002_1_sentencing-guidelines-drug-conspiracy-life-sentence.
11 Just last year a Florida prosecutor charged a 12-year-old as an adult in a first-
degree homicide case. Mark Woods, ‘Baby-Faced’ Boy’s Case Highlights Debate about Try-
ing Juveniles, THE FLA. TIMES-UNION (Dec. 5, 2011, 1:44 PM) http://jacksonville.com/
news/crime/2011-06-04/story/baby-faced-boys-case-highlights-debate-about-trying-
juveniles.
12 Miller 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
13 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
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nisms for “waiving” youth out of juvenile courts in order to try
them as adults,14 and changes in sentencing structure since the
1970s, combined with the politicization of parole decisions, mean
that fewer prisoners, including those convicted as youth, are re-
leased on parole.15 Thus, the limits of Graham and Miller as applied
to juveniles reflect the severity of the U.S. prison system as a whole
for all imprisoned people, regardless of age.
Other broader problems with the sentencing structure and
with the nature and elusive goals of the prison system seep through
the decisions, disrupting the Court’s line drawing. Writing for the
majority in Graham, Justice Kennedy noted, “[p]arts of the brain
involved in behavior control continue to mature through late ado-
lescence.”16 Research suggests this process of brain maturation
through adolescence continues until at least age 22.17 This would
at least raise questions about courts’ approaches to sentencing peo-
ple ages 18 to 22. Additionally, while this evidence points to adoles-
cents’ lessened culpability and their potential to dramatically
change, we should also question whether this means the Court
should allow for adults to be presumed incapable of rehabilitation.
Since evidence suggests that access to higher education and visits
from loved ones reduce the chances of imprisoned people commit-
ting new offenses once paroled,18 might this mean that, with cer-
tain supports, the potential for fundamental change in all
imprisoned people is far greater than many courts’ sentencing
practices recognize? Justice Kennedy even asked during oral argu-
ment in Graham, “[w]hy does a juvenile have a constitutional right
to hope, but an adult does not?”19
The Graham decision is peppered with unscientific terms such
14 Richard E. Redding, Juvenile Transfer Laws: An Effective Deterrent to Delinquency?,
JUV. JUST. BULL. (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Pre-
vention) 1 (2010), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/220595.pdf. Jus-
tice Kennedy points out that, while not necessarily a “realistic” practice in the most
extreme theoretical cases, in Florida a child of any age can legally be tried as an adult
and sentenced to life without parole for some offenses. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at
2025–26.
15 DORIS L. MACKENZIE, NAT’L INST. JUSTICE, SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS IN THE
21ST CENTURY: SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE FUTURE 19–20 (2001), available at http://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/189089.pdf.
16 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
17 Robert E. Shepherd, The Relevance of Brain Research to Juvenile Justice, 19 CRIM.
JUST. 51, 52 (2005).
18 See discussion infra Parts II and III.
19 Joan Biskupic, Kennedy Holds to Hope in 5-4 Ruling, USA TODAY (May 17, 2010,
10:20 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/2010-05-17-court-
kennedy_N.htm?csp=obinsite.
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as “irredeemable,”20 “incorrigible”21 and “irretrievably depraved
character”,22 which stem in part from language in the Court’s 2005
decision in Roper v. Simmons, barring capital punishment for
juveniles. The Miller decision also has a small number of quotes
from Graham containing these terms.23 The idea in Graham seems
to be that people age 17 and below who commit non-homicide of-
fenses may not represent any of those things—hence why a LWOP
sentence is inappropriate for them—but the same may not be said
about everyone else convicted of crimes. The decision recognizes
rehabilitation as “a penological goal that forms the basis of parole
systems” in determining that penological theories do not justify
non-homicide juvenile LWOP sentences.24 In support of its hold-
ing, the court in Miller reiterates Graham’s reasoning regarding the
role of the rehabilitation.25 Yet in many ways the nature and opera-
tion of prison run counter to any reformative or rehabilitative po-
tential and may be to blame for recidivism or return to prison
upon release. Rehabilitative opportunities for the thousands of
youth who are confined to adult prisons may range from limited to
non-existent.26 In these adult prisons, youth face a high risk of sui-
cide, are subject to physical and sexual abuse,27 and are not acces-
sing programs or education tailored to juveniles. For the high
percentage of imprisoned people suffering mental illness, behavior
associated with their mental illness may lead to disciplinary action,
including “segregation,” which may dramatically worsen their
mental health.28 Even prisoners with no preexisting mental health
issues may suffer hallucinations and other mental problems as a
result of being held in prolonged isolation—a punishment that
correctional officers have wide latitude in applying.29 Given these
and other forms of suffering that prisoners endure, coupled with
20 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
21 Id. at 2029.
22 Id. at 2026 (“Juveniles are more capable of change than are adults, and their
actions are less likely to be evidence of ‘irretrievably depraved character’ than are the
actions of adults.”) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005).
23 See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012).
24 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029–30.
25 Miller 132 S. Ct. at 2465.
26 JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
JUVENILES IN ADULT PRISONS AND JAIL: A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT 1 (2000), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/182503.pdf.
27 VINCENT SCHIRALDI & JASON ZEIDENBERG, JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, THE RISKS
JUVENILES FACE WHEN THEY ARE INCARCERATED WITH ADULTS (1997).
28 Jamie Fellner, A Corrections Quandary: Mental Illness and Prison Rules, 41 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 391, 398, 402–03 (2006).
29 Id. at 403.
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the decreasing access to already limited prison programming and
education, it is no wonder that Robert Dellelo, imprisoned for
nearly two-thirds of his life before his sentence was commuted,
notes that it is in spite of the current conditions of imprisonment,
not because of prison programming, that many prisoners are able
to “rehabilitate” themselves.30
Ultimately, when the Supreme Court underscores the poten-
tial for certain youth to be “reformed,” it silently accepts problem-
atic corollaries; namely, that it is fine to assume that adults and
potentially some youth convicted of homicide31 are incapable of
change, unworthy of clemency, and undeserving of another
chance. This Note explores the implications, for both youth and
adults, of this last presumption. It describes how increased impris-
onment and sentence lengths, as well as a lack of rehabilitative
prison programming and a denial of prisoners’ access to communi-
ties outside of prison, reflect a destructive notion that imprisoned
people are undeserving of hope. It briefly discusses alternatives to
this system in the form of decreased sentencing, increased access
to education and other services, and less reliance on imprisonment
overall.
Part I details the degree of severity in U.S. sentencing prac-
tices, as manifested over time, particularly since the initiation of
the “war on drugs,” and as compared to international practices. It
ties this harsh approach to the foundational role of racism in U.S.
prison and drug policy and points to the racial implications of both
the initial decision to sentence Terrance Jamar Graham to die in
prison and the Supreme Court’s decision to categorically protect
youth against LWOP sentences for non-homicide offenses. Part II
illustrates the extent to which the lack of hope that the Graham and
Miller decisions arguably permit the majority of imprisoned people
to bear is not only manifested in sentencing lengths, but also in a
growing denial of education and rehabilitative programming in
prisons.
Part III describes how imprisoned people are made invisible to
the broader public. Prisoners not only face barriers to meaningful
connection to loved ones, due to excessive phone rates and being
imprisoned far from their communities, but they are also hidden
30 Robert Dellelo, Epilogue to JAMIE BISSONETTE, WHEN THE PRISONERS RAN WAL-
POLE: A TRUE STORY IN THE MOVEMENT FOR PRISON ABOLITION 223, 224–25 (2008).
31 While the Court surmises that “appropriate occassions for sentencing juveniles
[convicted of homicide to LWOP] will be uncommon,” Miller does not categorically
bar juveniles convicted of homicide from facing LWOP sentences. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at
2469.
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from public view through restrictions on media access to prisons.
An overview of the press coverage of the imprisonment of Washing-
ton, D.C. residents since the early 1970s illustrates how the public
narrative of imprisonment in news media dramatically shifted over
time ultimately silencing those most able to speak reliably to condi-
tions and impacts of imprisonment: prisoners themselves. This “in-
visibilization”32 is part of a cycle of hopelessness in that it prevents
the public from being able to see prisoners’ humanity, and thus
being able to countenance their potential to return to society. It
also hides prison conditions that may cause the public to question
the role of prisons in addressing social problems. Part III further
shows how the ongoing practice of preventing prisoners’ observa-
tions of their conditions from reaching the public affects their per-
ceived credibility and severely limits their ability to impact their
conditions through democratic processes.
Finally, Part IV points to alternatives to hopelessness currently
proposed by prisoner advocates that address factors that lead to
imprisonment and that keep people imprisoned. I touch on the
historical example of the temporary reforms and changes in Massa-
chusetts correctional policy, which were spurred in the early 1970s
in large part by reformer John Boone and in the solutions that the
Massachusetts prisoners enacted themselves briefly at Walpole.
II. U.S. SENTENCING SEVERITY
The United States has the highest incarceration rate in the
32 I use invisibilization to capture how the prison system, its physical structure, its
legal and social ramifications, and the culture surrounding it, render imprisoned peo-
ple silent, socially dead, and without a place as citizens in a democratic process.
“Criminals” figure widely in political discourse, but as I describe later, people in
prison, or those formerly imprisoned, often only have a small role in shaping public
perceptions of their lives and conditions of imprisonment, or in political debates
about policies affecting them. Invisibilization has been used in other contexts to de-
scribe the public silence around the views and concerns of marginalized groups and
the disappearing of their perspectives and even their existence in historical conceptu-
alizations and political decision-making. See Alexandra Dobrowolsky, Interrogating ‘In-
visibilization’ and ‘Instrumentalization’: Women and Current Citizenship Trends in Canada,
12 CITIZENSHIP STUDIES 465, 465–66 (2008) (using invisibilization to describe how Ca-
nadian women and issues like feminization of poverty disappear from political dis-
course where the state’s primary goal is “the enhancement of market forces in a
competitive global economy . . . .”); Gasto´n Gordillo & Silvia Hirsch, Indigenous Strug-
gles and Contested Identities in Argentina: Histories of Invisibilization and Reemergence, 8 J. OF
LATIN AM. ANTHROPOLOGY 4, 4–6 (2003) (describing invisibilization as the lack of ac-
knowledgment of Indigenous people’s existence at the Argentinean nation-state’s for-
mation, in Argentinean history books, and in political decision-making, and
juxtaposing this with Indigenous groups’ struggle for visibilization in part through
state recognition).
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world, with approximately 2.3 million people behind bars, repre-
senting 756 people for every 100,000.33 By way of companson, this
is more than 6.5 times higher than the Canadian imprisonment
rate.34 Prison overcrowding is a serious problem in jurisdictions
throughout the United States,35 resulting in hazardous and inhu-
mane conditions for those imprisoned. The Supreme Court re-
cently upheld a court-ordered reduction of California’s prison
population, which will lower it from close to twice the prison sys-
tem’s design capacity to 137.5% of capacity. The Court found that
the current degree of overcrowding created conditions horrific
enough that they violated the Eighth Amendment.36 It further
found that overcrowding caused grossly inadequate mental health
and medical care, which resulted in preventable deaths, a suicide
rate of close to one per week, and an environment that supported
the rapid spread of disease among prisoners including antibiotic-
resistant staph infections.37
As a result of lengthy mandated sentences under both the
drug war and a general “tough-on-crime” approach, the national
average prison population increased six times over from 1972 to
2003.38 The number of people incarcerated for drug offenses in-
creased by over 11 times between 1980 and 2003,39 and the total
number of people held in state prisons grew by 70% from 1972 to
2008.40 Referred to even in mainstream Western European politi-
cal circles as an “inexplicable deformity,”41 the U.S. prison system
stands out globally for its harsh sentencing lengths. There is little
judicial check on elected politicans’ temptation to legislate in-
creased criminal sentences for easy political gain, as the Supreme
Court traditionally will not make proportionality determinations in
33 ROY WALMSLEY, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST
1, 3 (8th ed. 2009), available at http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/downloads/wppl-
8th_41.pdf.
34 Id. at 3.
35 MACKENZIE, supra note 15, at 20.
36 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1910 (2011).
37 Id. at 1923–25, 1933 n.7.
38 NELLIS & KING, supra note 7, at 1.
39 MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL RATES OF
INCARCERATION 7 (2003), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publica
tions/inc_comparative_intl.pdf.
40 PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, PRISON COUNT 2010: STATE POPULATION DECLINES FOR
THE FIRST TIME IN 38 YEARS 1 (2010), http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/
Prison_Count_2010.pdf.
41 MAUER, supra note 39, at 11.
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challenges to legislatively imposed sentence lengths.42 Only once
prior, in Solem v. Helm, has the Supreme Court found the length of
a prison sentence excessive.43 Because of mandatory sentencing
and other policies, prisoners often cannot find relief in parole.44 As
of 1987, parole was ended in the federal system45 and by 1990, 14
other states had abolished it as well.46 Observers note that where it
exists, the parole process is overwhelmingly politicized.47 Even
where eligibility is built into a life sentence it “does not equate to
release and, owing to the reticence of review boards and governors,
it has become increasingly difficult for persons serving a life sen-
tence to be released on parole.”48
While race as a significant factor in imprisonment is by no
means solely a U.S. phenomenon,49 the role of racism in the foun-
dation of today’s prison system and in the expanded use of polic-
ing and imprisonment as social policy in this country cannot be
ignored. Many prison scholars trace the racial disparity and capital-
ist exploitation permeating the criminal system back to the social
and economic control that powerful corporations and White land-
owners sought to keep over the free Black population in the Civil
War era. Similar to fugitive slave codes, “Black codes” enacted both
prior to and after the Civil War imposed impossible restrictions on
freed African-Americans. Innumerable new petty “crimes” were
created that were enforced by harsh prison sentences and forced
labor.50 One historian notes that the post-war courtroom became
“an ideal place to exact racial retribution” and that in addition to
facing a new set of criminal codes directed solely at them, African-
42 Jeffrey L. Fisher, The Exxon Valdez Case and Regularizing Punishment, 26 ALASKA L.
REV. 1, 36–37 (2009).
43 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (finding LWOP sentence for passing
bad check violated Eighth Amendment for being grossly disproportionate to crime in
question).
44 NELLIS & KING, supra note 7, at 1.
45 Id. at 5 n.3.
46 MACKENZIE, supra note 15, at 18.
47 NELLIS & KING, supra note 7, at 26–27.
48 Id. at 6.
49 MAUER, supra note 39, at 11 (noting similar racial disparity for imprisonment in
Australia, Canada, England, and Wales).
50 Crimes punishable by forced labor included attending a “nightly and disorderly
meeting,” vagrancy, inability to pay fines, insulting gestures or acts, and violating cur-
fews that were enforced solely against the Black community. See, e.g., DOUGLAS A.
BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS
FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II 1–2 (2008); SCOTT CHRISTIANSON, WITH LIB-
ERTY FOR SOME: 500 YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT IN AMERICA 171–72 (1998); ANGELA DAVIS,
ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 28–36 (2003); CONSTANCE MCLAUGHLIN GREEN, THE SECRET
CITY: A HISTORY OF RACE RELATIONS IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL 18–19 (1967).
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Americans often faced imprisonment under fabricated charges.51
The convict lease system and the population of African-Americans
subject to penal servitude expanded dramatically following the
Civil War.52 The number of imprisoned African-Americans far out-
paced the White convict population. Additionally, prisons became
overcrowded and prison populations changed from being prima-
rily White to being primarily Black.53 Convict laborers toiled on
plantations, railroads, in mines,54 and, for corporations like U.S.
Steel,55 under conditions described as “worse than slavery.”56
Today, prisons continue to be sites of capitalist exploitation57
and racial disparity. People of color are over-represented in the
criminal justice system at all stages. African-Americans are more
likely than Whites to be sentenced to incarceration for similar felo-
nies and are also given lengthier sentences.58 Studies suggest ra-
51 DAVIS, supra note 50, at 33–34 (2003) (citing MARY ANN CURTIN, BLACK PRISON-
ERS AND THEIR WORLD, ALABAMA 1865–1900 44 (2000)).
52 CHRISTIANSON, supra note 50, at 171–74.
53 DAVIS, supra note 50, at 29.
54 Id. at 32, 34–35.
55 BLACKMON, supra note 50, at 3.
56 See generally DAVID M. OSHINKSY, “WORSE THAN SLAVERY”: PARCHMAN FARM AND
THE ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE (1996).
57 Certain companies, such as Corrections Corporation of America and Geo
Group, operate private prisons. See generally Judith Greene, Banking on the Prison Boom,
in PRISON PROFITEERS: WHO MAKES MONEY OFF MASS INCARCERATION 3 (Tara Herivel &
Paul Wright eds., 2007). Private industry profits from the incarceration and social
control systems in myriad other ways, including by suppling the contracts for numer-
ous prison services such as medical care. In order to maximize profits, private compa-
nies that provide medical services often cut corners, creating cruelly low healthcare
standards in prisons that can and do result in deaths of inmates. See generally Wil S.
Hylton, Sick on the Inside: Correctional HMOs and the Coming Prison Plague, in PRISON
PROFITEERS: WHO MAKES MONEY OFF MASS INCARCERATION 179 (Tara Herivel & Paul
Wright eds., 2007). In some states private probation supervision companies are per-
mitted to charge additional fees that probationers must pay or face imprisonment for
failure to pay. Kirsten D. Levingston, Making the “Bad Guy” Pay: Growing Use of Cost
Shifting as Economic Sanction, in PRISON PROFITEERS: WHO MAKES MONEY OFF MASS IN-
CARCERATION 52, 70–72 (Tara Herivel & Paul Wright eds., 2007). Private telecommu-
nications companies offer states extraordinary kickbacks in order to receive lucrative
contracts for long-distance and collect calls from prisons and then pass the exorbitant
costs to the inmates and their loved ones. Ben Iddings, The Big Disconnect: Will Anyone
Answer the Call to Lower Excessive Prisoner Telephone Rates? 8 N.C. J. LAW & TECH. 159,
160–62 (2006). Additionally, prisons supply corporations with a large pool of workers
paid far below minimum wage—sometimes as little as 23 cents an hour—without nor-
mal labor standards and protections for benefits and rights. Ian Urbina, Prison Labor
Fuels America’s War Machine, in PRISON PROFITEERS: WHO MAKES MONEY OFF MASS IN-
CARCERATION 109, 110–11 (Tara Herivel & Paul Wright eds., 2007).
58 CHRISTOPHER HARTNEY & LINH VUONG, NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQ.,
CREATED EQUAL: RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN THE U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
2, 12 (2009), available at http://nccd-crc.issuelab.org/research/0/program/Reports/
filter/title (click on “Download” below article title).
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cism had an important role in the development of a U.S. drug
policy that emphasized penal sanctions in lieu of a public health
response; this approach flowed from inaccurate public associations
of crime and drug abuse with communities of color.59 The preva-
lence of skewed “crime news story scripts” in mainstream media
that focus on violent crime and depict African-Americans as the
primary perpetrators have been linked to support among Whites
for “tough” approaches to crime in general.60 There is also some
evidence that police act on the implicit racism permeating society
as a whole. A study of drug arrests in Seattle suggested that police
fail to see Whites as suspected drug users and deliverers, and thus
arrest them at rates disproportionately lower than their actual par-
ticipation in the drug trade.61 Comparatively, police arrest African-
American and Latino users and deliverers at rates far higher than
their actual participation.62 A Chicago study of youth arrests, con-
trolling for various socio-economic factors at the family and neigh-
borhood levels, found that racial disparity in arrests still
remained.63 Another study, seeking to explain vast racial disparities
in Wisconsin’s imprisonment rates, found evidence suggesting
“high levels of policing and surveillance of the African-American
population.”64 Racially disparate law enforcement patterns and ar-
rest rates for low-level offenses and for drug crimes contributed
heavily to Wisconsin’s imprisonment disparities.65 Nationally, the
59 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TARGETING BLACKS: DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT AND RACE
IN THE UNITED STATES 4–5 (2008), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/
files/reports/us0508_1.pdf.
60 Franklin D. Gilliam Jr., Nicholas A. Valentino, & Matthew N. Beckmann, Where
You Live and What You Watch: The Impact of Racial Proximity and Local Television News on
Attitudes About Race and Crime, 55 POL. RES. Q. 755, 758–59 (2002). Media depiction of
cocaine use changed as crack cocaine came to be used in impoverished communities.
The media narrative—which in the early 1980s focused on White users, on elements
of the drug treatment industry and on the potential for recovery—by the mid-1980s
featured law enforcement officials underscoring policing and imprisonment ap-
proaches to the drug, and people of color figuring as the criminalized drug users and
dealers. Katherine Beckett, Kris Nyrop, Lori Pfingst, & Melissa Bowen, Drug Use, Drug
Possession Arrests, and the Question of Race: Lessons from Seattle, 52 SOC. PROBS. 419, 421
(2005).
61 Katherine Beckett, Kris Nyrop, & Lori Pfingst, Race, Drugs, and Policing: Under-
standing Disparities in Drug Delivery Arrests, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 105, 108, 117–22 (2006).
62 Id.
63 David S. Kirk, The Neighborhood Context of Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Arrest, 45
DEMOGRAPHY 55, 71–74 (2008).
64 PAMELA OLIVER & JAMES YOCOM, INST. FOR RESEARCH ON POVERTY, RACIAL DISPAR-
ITIES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: MADISON AND DANE COUNTY IN CONTEXT 28 (2002), available
at http://www.irp.wisc.edu/publications/dps/pdfs/dp125702.pdf.
65 Id. at 28–31.
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incarceration-focused “drug war” initiated in the early 1980s66 spe-
cifically targeted communities of color, and ultimately resulted in
disproportionate numbers of people of color being sent to prison,
despite the fact that illicit drug use was proportionately nearly
equal among different racial groups in all communities.67
One metric of the harshness of U.S. criminal justice system,
and a key factor in its outsized prison population, is the increasing
number of defendants sentenced to life imprisonment. The
amount of people serving a life sentence, not including those sen-
tenced to a term of years equivalent to or greater than a natural life
before becoming parole eligible, increased more than four times
from approximately 34,000 in 1984 to 140,610 in 2008.68 LWOP
sentences increased by 22% in just five years from 2003 to 2008.69
The Supreme Court has noted that a LWOP sentence is the “sec-
ond most severe penalty permitted by law.”70 The Court compared
the severity of LWOP sentences to that of death sentences:
[L]ife without parole sentences share some characteristics with
death sentences that are shared by no other sentences. The
State does not execute the offender sentenced to life without
parole, but the sentence alters the offender’s life by a forfeiture
that is irrevocable.71
As with policing and imprisonment as a whole, communities
of color are the most heavily affected by life-sentencing practices.
African-Americans comprise almost half the life-sentenced popula-
tion nationally, though the percentage of African-Americans in the
general prison population is 37.5%.72 This reflects an overall trend
across the criminal system, where the harsher the sentence in ques-
tion, the more concentrated the number of sentenced people of
color.73 Such extensive and severe rates of imprisonment impact
communities outside of the prisons. As of 2000, an estimated 1.5
million children were growing up without the emotional or finan-
66 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 59, at 9 n.15 (noting that drug policy
switched from treatment to punishment after the 1970s, which federal drug budgets
consistently reflected).
67 Id. at 14, 41–46.
68 NELLIS & KING, supra note 7, at 7.
69 Id. at 3.
70 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010) (citing Harmelin v. Michigan,
501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)).
71 Id. at 2027.
72 NELLIS & KING, supra note 7, at 11, 26. The JLWOP sentence was disproportion-
ately applied to youth of color. African-American youth comprised 56.1% of the
juveniles sentenced to life without parole as of 2008.
73 Id. at 14.
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cial support of a parent because that parent was imprisoned, with
the number reaching one out of every 14 among African-American
children.74
When pronouncing the JLWOP sentence at issue in Graham,
the trial court judge said to Mr. Graham, who was born to crack-
addicted parents and began drinking alcohol and smoking at age
nine,75 “[y]ou had, as far as I can tell, you have quite a family struc-
ture. You had a lot of people who wanted to try and help you
. . . .”76 Chief Justice Roberts noted in his concurrence that “Gra-
ham’s sentence was far more severe than that imposed for similar
violations of Florida law, even without taking juvenile status into
account.”77 He pointed out that in Florida, the average adult
sentences for burglary or robbery are “less than five and less than
ten years, respectively,”78 and juvenile sentences are even shorter.
He wrote, “Graham’s life without parole sentence was far more se-
vere than the average sentence imposed on those convicted of
murder or manslaughter, who typically receive under 25 years in
prison.”79 While Roberts highlighted these facts in order to argue
against the majority’s categorical standard protecting youth from
LWOP sentences, and to call for a case-by-case “narrow proportion-
ality” standard for deciding if a non-capital sentence violates the
Eighth Amendment,80 these facts undercut his argument. He criti-
qued the majority decision for emphasizing that a “clear line is nec-
essary to prevent the possibility that life without parole sentences
will be imposed on juvenile non-homicide offenders who are not
sufficiently culpable to merit that punishment.”81 Yet the renegade
actions on the part of the trial court judge that he describes, which
could easily be repeated or followed, point to the merits of a cate-
gorical rule that would prevent this type of action by judges.
The racial implications of the decision, unspoken by the
Court, add weight to the majority opinion. As noted earlier, the
concentration of sentenced people of color becomes greater and
even more out of proportion to their percentage in the general
population, the harsher the punishment in question.82 It is rele-
74 MAUER, supra note 39, at 14–15.
75 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018.
76 Id. at 2019.
77 Id. at 2040 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
78 Id.
79 Id. at 2041 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
80 Id. at 2039, 2041 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
81 Id. at 2042 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
82 NELLIS & KING, supra note 7, at 14.
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vant to note that the petitioner in Graham is African-American, and
as Chief Justice Roberts pointed out, was treated far more severely
by the sentencing judge than most people similarly convicted
would be.83 The undeniable role of race and racism in sentencing
decisions84 further demonstrates that the majority’s argument for
standards and a clear line with regard to harsh sentencing practices
has merit. Yet it also underscores broader problems raised by Jus-
tices Thomas and Alito in their dissents,85 such as the fact that this
decision does not explicitly protect juveniles (and protects no
adults) from extremely lengthy term-of-years sentences, including
those equivalent to a life. Had the trial court sentenced Graham to
30 or 40 years imprisonment, which is still far greater than the aver-
age sentence for his convictions, the case may never have reached
the Court despite the unfairness and the destructive impacts of
such a long sentence on a youth. Thus, what is called for is systemic
change far greater than what the Court provides. As described
later, grassroots organizations and other advocates have long rec-
ognized this. They are committed to creating the necessary broad
social movement, not only to hold officials accountable for racial
disparity in the criminal system, but also to hold them accountable
for the destructive impacts of reliance on imprisonment in general.
III. DENYING EDUCATION, ENCOURAGING RECIDIVISM
Along with increased imprisonment rates and lengthier
sentences, a lack of access to educational and other rehabilitative
programming in prisons can create hopeless prospects for people
convicted under the U.S. criminal system. Following the termina-
tion of Federal Pell Grant college funding for prisoners in 1994,
there was a dramatic drop in postsecondary education programs
and enrollment at prisons, with the number of states offering col-
lege programs declining from 37 to 21 by 1997, and less than 2% of
the national prison population enrolled in them.86 In the years fol-
lowing the loss of Pell grants, a significant number of other rehabil-
83 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2040–41 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
84 See ASHLEY NELLIS, JUDY GREENE, & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RE-
DUCING RACIAL DISPARITY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3, 14 (2d ed. 2008).
85 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2052 n.11 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[I]t seems odd that
the Court counts only those juveniles sentenced to life without parole and excludes
from its analysis all juveniles sentenced to lengthy term-of-years sentences (e.g., 70 or
80 years’ imprisonment).”); Id. at 2058 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Nothing in the Court’s
opinion affects the imposition of a sentence to a term of years without the possibility
of parole. Indeed, petitioner conceded at oral argument that a sentence of as much as
40 years without the possibility of parole ‘probably’ would be constitutional.”).
86 WENDY ERISMAN & JEANNE BAYER CONTARDO, THE INST. FOR HIGHER EDUC. POL-
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itative and educational programs in prisons were cut, including
vocational and technical training and even some secondary schools
as imprisonment increased and state and federal funding
decreased.87
While prison administrators have drawn on state funding and
federal block grants directed at post-secondary education for incar-
cerated youth to continue post-secondary programming at many
prisons,88 a 2003–2004 survey by The Institute for Higher Educa-
tion Policy found that college courses were available to around just
5% of prisoners, and that actual rates of completion were low.89
The majority of incarcerated students taking college-level courses
and receiving certificates were enrolled in vocational certificate
programs for college credit, and there were not significant num-
bers of students earning college or even associates level degrees.90
While the primary barrier to enrollment in college-level courses
was a lack of funding, according to the survey respondents, other
barriers to enrollment and completion included the need for sub-
stantial academic remediation among potential students, prohibi-
tive security protocols that create logistical barriers, overcrowding
resulting in transfers that disrupt students’ coursework, and a lack
of support for the programs among policymakers.91
Tragically, the lack of access to adequate education in prisons
represents a continued denial of education to a population that
overwhelmingly did not gain adequate educational services prior to
incarceration. State and federal prisoners are significantly under-
educated compared to the general population. A larger percentage
of state and federal prisoners lack a General Educational Develop-
ment (GED) or high school diploma as compared to the house-
hold population,92 and one study found that of those imprisoned
who had earned a GED by 1997, at least 70% obtained it while in
prison.93 While 51% of the general household population as of
ICY, LEARNING TO REDUCE RECIDIVISM: A FIFTY STATE ANALYSIS OF POSTSECONDARY COR-
RECTIONAL EDUCATIONAL POLICY x (2005).
87 Eric Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, How to Construct an Underclass, or How the War
on Drugs Became a War on Education, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 61, 75 n.71 (2002).
88 ERISMAN & CONTARDO, supra note 86, at xi.
89 Id. at vi.
90 Id.
91 Id. at vi–vii.
92 As of 1997 only 60% of state prisoners and 73% of federal prisoners had a GED
or high school diploma compared to 82% of the general U.S. population. Id. at 4.
93 Id. In 1991 the Federal Bureau of Prisons required that prisoners receive educa-
tion adequate to earn a GED or a minimum of 240 hours of literacy instruction,
whichever was achieved first. Emily A. Whitney, Correctional Rehabilitation Programs and
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2003 had completed some post-secondary education, only 22% of
imprisoned people had.94 The rate of diagnosed learning disabili-
ties was higher in prisons as of 2003, at 17% versus 6% in the adult
household population.95 Illiteracy rates are also higher among im-
prisoned people than among the general adult household popula-
tion, with one study finding 56% of prisoners at basic or below
basic literacy levels for prose and 50% in those two bottom catego-
ries for documents, versus 43% and 34% respectively for house-
hold populations.96 Another report estimates that 70% of federal
and state prisoners are functionally illiterate or read below an
eighth grade level.97 One study also found that the rate of language
impairment disorders, including difficulty understanding spoken
language, to be four to five times higher among imprisoned adults
than in the general population,98 and that up to 84% of institution-
alized juveniles have severe communication difficulties.99
In hopeful contrast to these bleak statistics are the success
rates that literacy and higher education programs can have in
preventing people from returning to prison. Recidivism dramati-
cally drops among formerly imprisoned people who have partici-
pated in higher education while in prison, averaging about 46%
lower than recidivism rates of those formerly imprisoned people
who have not participated in post-secondary classes, according to
one analysis.100 Another study found that while programming like
GED courses or vocational training is helpful, post-secondary edu-
cation is even more effective, reducing chances of re-incarceration
by 62%.101 Evidence also shows that post-secondary level education
significantly increases employment chances for formerly impris-
oned people.102
Other opportunity-providing programs for prisoners, includ-
the Adoption of International Standards, 18 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 777,
787–88, 788 n.77 (2009).
94 ELIZABETH GREENBERG, ERIC DUNLEAVY, MARK KUTNER, & SHEIDA WHITE, NAT’L
CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, LITERACY BEHIND BARS: RESULTS FROM THE 2003 NATIONAL
ASSESSMENT OF ADULT LITERACY PRISON SURVEY 27 (2007).
95 Id.
96 Id. at 29.
97 ARK. LITERACY COUNCIL, ADULT ILLITERACY: ITS COST TO US ALL 2 (2005).
98 Michele La Vigne & Gregory J. Van Rybroek, Breakdown in the Language Zone: The
Prevalence of Language Impairments Among Juvenile and Adult Offenders and Why it Matters,
15 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y. 37 (2011).
99 Id. at 44 n.12.
100 ERISMAN & CONTARDO, supra note 86, at 9.
101 Id.
102 OPEN SOCIETY INST., EDUCATION AS CRIME PREVENTION 7–8 (1997), available at
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/research_brief__2.pdf.
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ing furlough and work release programs, have also seen cuts in the
context of the “get tough” movement.103 Ironically, in deciding if a
prisoner qualifies for parole, parole boards often look to whether
that person has completed certain programs that will help him or
her secure income, including education and job training. They
also look to whether he or she has succeeded in a work release
program. Having a viable job prospect outside the prison, which is
often established through work release programs that allow impris-
oned people to make contacts with community members, also sup-
ports a potential parolee’s case. In terms of both increasing
prisoners’ prospects for liberation and for a successful, permanent
exit from prison, it is clear that education and other programming
that bring prisoners into contact with a broad community are im-
portant and should be expanded.
IV. INCOMMUNICADO & INVISIBLE: IMPRISONMENT AS EXILE
Often cut off from communicating even with close family
members, and blocked from media cameras and reporters, impris-
oned people are largely walled out of public consciousness. This
invisibilization has disturbing implications both for imprisoned
people’s ability to rebuild their lives and for the extent to which
human rights abuses can happen inside of prisons with little to no
consequences for those responsible. One key way that communica-
tion with loved ones outside of prison is made difficult for impris-
oned people is through excessive phone charges. One
investigation found that just one hour-long collect call per week
can cost the family of an imprisoned person nearly $300 a
month.104 Because prisons are frequently located in remote rural
areas, far from the primarily impoverished urban communities
where prisoners’ friends and loved ones live,105 and because states
often send prisoners to out-of-state private prisons, calls between
prisoners and their family and friends are usually long-distance and
collect.106 By the mid-1990s, almost all prisons took commission
payments, or “kickbacks,” from the profits of high-cost prison
phone charges, with the commission running up to 60% in some
103 For example, restrictions to New York’s Temporary Release Program enacted in
the mid-1990s caused over a 90% decline in inmate participation. Alan Rosenthal &
Patricia Warth, In Search of a Workable Sentencing Model, ATTICUS, Winter 2011, at 11.
104 MEDIA JUSTICE FUND, CRIMINAL CHARGES: EXCESSIVE PRISON PHONE RATES TAKE A
TOLL ON INNOCENT FAMILIES 2 (2009), available at https://org2.democracyinaction.
org/o/6587/images/MJFPrisonPhones-final.pdf.
105 3 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 13:1 (4th ed. 2009).
106 MEDIA JUSTICE FUND, supra note 104.
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states.107 Because of grassroots organizing, the number of states
taking these kickbacks has decreased, but the problem remains,
and the cost is still extremely high for interstate collect calls from
all prisons.108 Imprisoned people primarily come from impover-
ished backgrounds,109 and for many of their families, the exploitive
costs of communicating via phone may be too great to bear. For
those imprisoned and their family members who may have limited
literacy skills, including the young children of imprisoned people,
letters would likely be a difficult medium. Further, letters do not
provide the immediacy and emotional connection of personal visits
and phone calls. Visiting a loved one in a prison located far away
from home often also proves too expensive and is made further
difficult through limits on visiting times that restrict opportunities
for working people to visit their loved ones.110
The effects of marooning imprisoned people through these
limitations on communication can be particularly dramatic for
their children. One former prisoner in Washington, D.C. de-
scribed what happened to his family when he was put on one of
many “loads” of prisoners that the Department of Corrections sent
far from the D.C. area to prisons across the country.111 Imprisoned
at Lorton, Virginia since 1983, and jailed in D.C. prior to that, he
had maintained close ties to his family via phone conversations and
personal visits, and supported his children in their schoolwork over
the phone and during visits.112 For the cost of a city bus ride, his
family would visit him every Sunday.113 In 1988, he was sent without
warning to the prison at Walla Walla, Washington:114 “It was the
only time that I had been separated to that magnitude with my
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 A 1997 study found the reported unemployment rate of prisoners in the month
prior to their arrest was over six times the average unemployment rate in the United
States. Nine percent were homeless in that month while an estimated 1% of the gen-
eral population experienced homelessness at some point within a year. For those with
income, 43% reported earnings of less than $9,600 a year. Among African-American
imprisoned people, the rates of pre-arrest unemployment and poverty were even
higher. ERISMAN & CONTARDO, supra note 86, at 2–3.
110 MUSHLIN, supra note 105.
111 This event happened prior to the final closure of Lorton Reformatory in Vir-
ginia, the prison where most people sentenced to prison terms in Washington, D.C.
were sent. After closing the prison, the Department of Corrections began sending
D.C. residents serving prison sentences to prisons scattered across the country in
places as far away as Youngstown, Ohio and Walla Walla, Washington.
112 Interview with formerly incarcerated person #1, Wash., D.C. (Oct. 10–11 2006 &
Nov. 2, 2006) (on file with author).
113 Id.
114 Id.
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kids,” he said, “[a]nd my kids’ grades dropped. One of my sons got
to acting crazy. He decided he wanted to hang out.”115
Studies suggest that for children, having a parent in prison
can lead to emotional, mental, and behavioral problems,116 and
that the consequences of this separation include a risk of involve-
ment in criminal behavior and even imprisonment.117 While re-
search is limited, there is evidence that the ability to have quality
visits with their incarcerated parent, particularly with contact, and
to maintain connection with them improves outcomes for youth.118
There is strong evidence that imprisoned peoples’ ability to main-
tain a connection with family members and loved ones encourages
rehabilitation and reduces recidivism.119
Another way prisoners are made invisible to the public, and
thus dehumanized, is through the news media’s lack of access to
prisons and jails. Supreme Court cases decided in the early 1970s
granted prison authorities wide latitude to deny journalists access
to interview prisoners, and to prohibit media outlets from filming
or photographing inside of prisons.120 In Pell v. Procunier, the Su-
preme Court held constitutional the denial of non-written personal
contact between prisoners and the media, upholding a policy that,
among other restrictions, prohibited reporters from interviewing
prisoners who were not chosen by guards for interviews through
the prison’s randomized process for selecting interviewees, or
outside of a guided tour.121 The Court established an “alternative
means” test and found that the policy withstood the test, in part,
because prisoners could theoretically correspond through “uncen-
sored” mail with media.122 Of course, for prisoners with limited lit-
eracy skills, this has little meaning. Furthermore, the definition of
115 Id.
116 Elise Zealand, Protecting the Ties that Bind from Behind Bars, 31 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 247, 277–78 (1998).
117 Id. at 278; Nkechi Taifa & Catherine Beane, Integrative Solutions to Interrelated
Issues: A Multidisciplinary Look Behind the Cycle of Incarceration, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
283, 289 (2009).
118 Benjamin Guthrie Stewart, When Should a Court Order Visitation Between a Child
and an Incarcerated Parent?, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 165, 172–74 (2002).
119 See generally William D. Bales & Daniel P. Mears, Inmate Social Ties and the Transi-
tion to Society: Does Visitation Reduce Recidivism?, 45 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 287 (2008).
120 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827–28, 834–35 (1974) (finding that policy
preventing non-written personal contact between imprisoned people and reporters
was constitutional); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (holding that
Federal Bureau of Prisons policy prohibiting personal interviews between reporters
and prisoners in federal medium and maximum security prisons did not violate First
Amendment).
121 Pell, 417 U.S. at 830.
122 Id. at 824.
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“uncensored mail” has been interpreted to include outgoing pris-
oners’ mail that is subject to inspection and restriction by prison
officials, including for content of the letter,123 which would neces-
sarily limit what prisoners can communicate about prison
conditions.
Other states have banned in-person media interviews of pris-
oners altogether.124 In states with fewer restrictions on media ac-
cess to prisons, more liberal laws prove meaningless and are readily
ignored by unaccountable prison administrators.125 As one Repub-
lican Assemblyman in California, critiquing California’s severe re-
strictions on media access to prisoners, pointed out: “[f]ree
societies don’t hold prisoners incommunicado.”126 And yet, the
combined restrictions on visitors generally, and on the media spe-
cifically with regard to accessing prisons, mean that prisoners’ im-
mediate perspectives and images of people imprisoned rarely
reach the public.
A survey of local news articles about prisons in Washington,
D.C. over the past several decades exemplifies a shift in the main-
stream media narrative toward denying prisoners’ humanity by si-
lencing them and making them invisible. Whether as a result of
journalists’ decreased access to prisons or a change in overall edito-
rial sentiment and policy, both the images and the voices of prison-
ers all but disappeared from print media stories a few years after
the 1971 Attica prison uprising. In the time immediately following
that uprising, when D.C. prisoners staged uprisings or demonstra-
123 Alana M. Sitterly, Silencing Death Row Inmates: How Hammer v. Ashcroft Needs a
Rational Basis for Its Rational Basis, 21 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 323, 345–46 (2011)
(pointing out that in referring to the “alternative communication rationale” from Pell
to uphold restrictions on access to media by prisoners in its decision in Hammer v.
Ashcroft (Hammer II), 570 F.3d 798, 804 (7th Cir. 2009), the Seventh Circuit glossed
over the fact that all outgoing inmate mail was subject to inspection, and that the
prison-imposed content restrictions prohibited references to other inmates in written
correspondence or via phone). This runs counter to the Supreme Court’s justification
in Pell, which suggested that prisoners with limited literacy skills could communicate
to the press through other prisoners with greater literacy skills, thus justifying restric-
tions on in-person interviews. Pell, 417 U.S. at 827–28 n.5. Pell also specifically protects
content of letters in noting that a communication restriction is appropriate “[s]o long
as this restriction operates in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of ex-
pression[.]” Id. at 828.
124 Don Thompson, More States Restricting Media Access to Inmates, Survey Finds, ST.
AUGUSTINE RECORD, Dec. 11, 2000, http://staugustine.com/stories/121000/nat_1210
000025.shtml.
125 CHRISTINA RATHBONE, A WORLD APART: WOMEN, PRISON, AND LIFE BEHIND BARS
xii-xiii (2006).
126 Davis Vetoes Measure to Overturn Interview Restrictions on Inmates, METRO. NEWS
ENTER., Sept. 9, 1999, at 9.
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tions, newspapers showed images of prisoners holding protest
signs, with their messages clear, and the accompanying stories
quoting both prisoners and prison system administrators.127 In an
article on a 1972 prisoners’ strike, Washington Post reporter William
Claiborne described a tour of the maximum security section of
prison at Lorton, guided by a prisoner who told reporters he was
beaten by guards while handcuffed when he was transferred there
from medium security:
About 15 reporters and photographers then toured the maxi-
mum security area . . . observing tiny windowless cells in a tier
that the inmates call the “hole,” and the administration calls the
“control section.” They talked with a number of inmates who
said they had been confined for months on a 24 hour a day
“deadlock” without having faced formal disciplinary board
charges. “Deadlock” prisoners leave their cells only twice a week
. . . . Members of the grievance committee showed visitors a cell
in which an apparently mentally disturbed man cowered under
his bunk. The inmates said the man had rarely emerged from
under the bed in 17 months.128
By the mid-1980s, the media reduced the use of photographs, pris-
oner quotations,129 and for the most part, prison guard quotations,
in their coverage of prison demonstrations.130 The only perspec-
127 For example, an article in The Washington Post on a September 1972 demonstra-
tion at Lorton prison, features direct quotes from prisoners and a photograph of
maximum security prisoner Van LaGon standing in front of a bank of microphones,
delivering his message to press and prison officials, while a light rain falls on a protest
of over 1,000 Lorton prisoners massed in the main courtyard. William L. Claiborne,
Prisoners at Lorton Win Reforms, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 1972, at A1. This peaceful strike
received about four days’ worth of editorials and local news coverage. Much of the
coverage shows prisoners holding signs and intently watching negotiations. See Wil-
liam L. Claiborne, Inmates Give Lorton Aides 12 Demands, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 1972, at
C1; William Raspberry, The Problem at Lorton, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1972, at A27; Wil-
liam Raspberry, Winning ‘War’ at Lorton, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 1972, at A27.
128 Claiborne, Prisoners at Lorton, supra, note 127, at A1.
129 See, e.g., Alma Guillermoprieto, Inmates’ Strike Halts Lorton Manufacturing—Anger
over Delay in Pay, Food Supplements Blamed, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 1983, at C4 (reporting
a strike at Lorton’s Central Facility that solely uses the words of the D.C. Department
of Corrections spokesman as its source); Eric Pianin, Prisoners Stage Protest at Lorton,
WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1985, at B4 (reporting a protest by 170 maximum security in-
mates that included no quotes by imprisoned people). In a short break with the gen-
eral pattern of not publishing quotes by imprisoned people, The Washington Post
published a short series about Lorton in February 1983 that included interviews with
prisoners, guards, and other staff. See Edward D. Sargent, A Prisoner, a Journalist: Two
Lives, Two Roads, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 1983, at A1.
130 Apparently, guards primarily expressed anger when administrators acceded to
some demands by prison demonstrators, but a small number expressed some sympa-
thy with the prisoners. Journalist Raul Ramirez described one interview with a correc-
tional officer following a prisoner demonstration: “Officer Ronald Savoy claimed that
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tives print journalists quoted on prison issues, whether those stem-
ming from uprisings or otherwise, are by prison system
administrators, lawyers, and politicians.131
The lack of prisoners as everyday interview subjects represents
a form of presumed “narrative incompetence” on the part of pris-
oners.132 The underlying message is that imprisonment renders
one incapable of the human abilities to reflect, to step outside one-
self and provide analysis that accounts for an array of perspectives
while honestly portraying one’s own conditions. As one imprisoned
person observed, “prisoners, although they understand what is
wrong with the system better than any criminologist, judge, cop, or
outsider, have the credibility of elves.”133
This denial of credibility is also convenient for corrections offi-
cials seeking to avoid accountability for human rights violations oc-
curring in prisons including:  the use of physical violence against
prisoners; purposeful denial of prisoner medical care; rampant
misuse of stun weapons, chemical sprays, and restraints; and use of
solitary confinement to quiet anyone who would challenge these
and other violations.134 The types of abuses news reporter William
Claiborne heard from the prisoners at Lorton in the early 1970s
have certainly not ended, but they now receive less news coverage.
Denying access to prisons stifles the democratic function media
serves in helping the public address these abuses. Charles N. Davis,
attempts by officers to help individual inmates often are blocked by unsympathetic
supervisors. ‘The way inmates are treated is unfair,’ he said . . . . Savoy claimed that
other guards shared his views, but are just scared to let them be known to their super-
visors for fear of harassment.” Raul Ramirez, Guards Assail Jail Head for Cut in Power,
WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1973, at B1.
131 According to Washington, D.C. residents imprisoned during the 1980s, several
other uprisings and strikes to address poor conditions occurred at Lorton, many of
which were brutally suppressed by guards and not covered by the media. For those
that were covered, interviewees who were imprisoned at the time often had far differ-
ent perceptions and remembrances of events than those the administrators provided
to the media. Interview with formerly incarcerated person #1, Wash., D.C. (Oct.
10–11, 2006 & Nov. 2, 2006) (on file with author); Interview with formerly incarcer-
ated person #2, Wash., D.C. (Nov. 2, 2006) (on file with author).
132 In the late 19th century, journalist Henry Mayhew interviewed impoverished
London residents about their lives and helped set a standard that challenged social
researchers to presume that marginalized communities have the ability to adequately
provide meaningful information about their own experiences, thus challenging the
notion of narrative incompetence researchers had previously assigned them. JAMES A.
HOLSTEIN & JABER F. GUBRIUM, THE ACTIVE INTERVIEW: QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METH-
ODS 21, 22 (1995).
133 Jessica Feierman, Creative Prison Lawyering: From Silence to Democracy, 11 GEO. J.
POVERTY LAW & POL’Y 249, 255 n.34 (2004) (citing Paul St. John, Behind the Mirror’s
Face, in DOING TIME 119, 121 (Bell Gale Chevigny ed., 1999)).
134 Id. at 254–55.
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Freedom of Information co-chairman of the Society of Professional
Journalists, notes, “[t]he correctional industry is the only func-
tional unit of state governance free from the scrutiny of an active
press, and it is at our peril that we allow prisons to run in the
dark.”135
V. ALTERNATIVES
A vision of alternatives to imprisonment and the current U.S.
prison system should encompass the needs of people currently im-
prisoned and consider broader societal factors contributing to
mass incarceration including sentencing policy and socio-eco-
nomic issues. As discussed earlier, for those inside, it is clear that
maintaining ties with family and the broader community, and ac-
cessing rehabilitative programming, particularly education, are key
to their success outside of prison. Thus, such programming should
be dramatically expanded. Additional elements that diminish re-
cidivism include mental health and drug treatment, training, and
alternative sentencing.136 Other industrialized countries have dra-
matically lowered imprisonment rates through changes to sentenc-
ing policy. In Germany, for example, officials substantially reduced
the prison population and cycle of imprisonment by reducing the
use of short prison terms.137 One scholar notes that “the German
legislature had embraced the idea that short-term imprisonment
does more harm than good; it disrupts the offender’s ties with fam-
ily, job, and friends, introduces the offender into the prison subcul-
ture, and stigmatizes the offender for the rest of his or her life.”138
Clearly, ending the use of imprisonment to address social and pub-
lic health issues like drug use would also dramatically reduce the
number of people stigmatized through imprisonment.
Building alternatives also calls for shifting public expenditures
away from prisons and toward social and community programs that
address factors leading to imprisonment. There is a growing under-
standing that included among “factors contributing to . . . criminal
conduct” are “poverty, unemployment, inadequate living condi-
tions such as substandard housing and homelessness . . . .”139 Advo-
cates are also more sharply focusing on the school-to-prison
135 Press Release, Society of Professional Journalists, SJP Asks Massachusetts DOC to
Drop Proposed Inmate Interview Restrictions (June 21, 2002), available at http://
www.spj.org/news.asp?ref=247.
136 Feierman, supra note 133, at 250 n.7.
137 MAUER, supra note 34, at 9.
138 Id.
139 Taifa & Beane, supra note 117, at 291.
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pipeline, elements of which include zero-tolerance policies, in-
creased use of expulsions and suspensions, under-resourced
schools, and racism, all which ultimately lead to increased impris-
onment.140 Groups like America’s Promise Alliance, a multi-sector
organization devoted to improving the wellbeing of young people,
propose a number of policy shifts to address these underlying fac-
tors and ensure developmental resources for youth.141 A RAND
Corporation study found that crime prevention is more cost-effec-
tive for governments and municipalities than investing in pris-
ons.142 A report from the Sentencing Project points to “a variety of
research demonstrat[ing] that investment in drug treatment, inter-
ventions with at-risk families, and school completion programs are
more cost-effective than expanded incarceration as crime control
measures.”143
There are points in history we can look to for successful alter-
natives, such as the profound changes that occurred temporarily at
Walpole, in Massachusetts, in the wake of the uprising at Attica and
a major community organizing campaign both in and out of the
Walpole prison, which are well documented by historian Jamie Bis-
sonette. In 1972, the governor of Massachusetts appointed John
Boone, a progressive reformer who ultimately became a prison ab-
olitionist, as the first African-American commissioner of correc-
tions.144 Boone ushered in a series of reforms similar to those he
had enacted at Lorton Reformatory in Virginia, where he had
briefly served as superintendent before going to Massachusetts.145
These reforms included furloughs, educational and vocational
training, and other community-based programs. Rehabilitation was
his central focus, with the ultimate goal being the shuttering of
large state prisons.146 Under his appointment, recidivism rates
dropped by close to two-thirds,147 and it appeared his vision could
have born out his goals. Unfortunately, the political and racial cli-
mate of Massachusetts was not prepared to allow him success. How-
ever, following a walkout by guards in retaliation for Boone’s
having met some prisoners’ demands in response to a determined
strike by inmates that the guards had met with fierce brutality, the
140 Id. at 289–90.
141 Id. at 296–97.
142 OPEN SOCIETY INST., supra note 102, at 8.
143 RYAN S. KING, MARC MAUER, & MALCOLM YOUNG, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, IN-
CARCERATION AND CRIME: A COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP 8 (2005).
144 JAMIE BISSONETTE, WHEN THE PRISONERS RAN WALPOLE 40–50 (2008).
145 Id. at 46–47.
146 Id. at 64–65.
147 Id. at 9.
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prisoners actually took over the prison and ran it themselves for
over two months. The temporary end of brutal treatment by
guards, and an end to murders, rapes, and robberies, ensued.148 At
a time when racial tension in Boston was becoming more heated in
the lead-up to explosive reactions to court-ordered school desegre-
gation, the prisoners at Walpole had developed a sophisticated me-
diation program and method for maintaining internal order, and
were engaged in the effective and peaceful cross-racial organizing
of the workings of the entire prison.149 Prisoners, who had found
solidarity in similar experiences of poverty and deprivation
throughout much of their lives, operated on a sense of restorative
justice, self-determination, and community building. While the
prisoners were brutally repressed when the state retook the
prison,150 the lessons of those several weeks and what they mean
for how “corrections” should be approached are invaluable. This
example of meaningful exercise of imprisoned peoples’ agency,
not just in running a prison but in guiding a movement, should
strongly inform current advocacy efforts.
VI. CONCLUSION
With regard to the often-conjured pendulum swinging be-
tween rehabilitation and retribution, Graham and Miller should
sound like a broken gear signaling the extreme distance the pen-
dulum has traveled in one direction. How far into unthinking retri-
bution has the U.S. criminal justice system gone if the U.S.
Supreme Court is only now recognizing that it should blink when a
judge sentences a juvenile to imprisonment for the rest of his or
her life? While the Court holds its nose and speaks of the chances
prison will reform a youth’s “character deficiencies,” the challenge
is for community-based movements from an array of sectors to con-
tinue to shine light on the societal deficiencies that feed crime and
criminalization, and to underscore the important visioning and en-
actment of alternatives happening now amongst communities most
impacted by imprisonment.
148 Id. at 123–68.
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